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Abstract. The current study aims to empirically explore the relationship between firm 
characteristics, corporate governance and capital structure in New Zealand’s large listed 
companies. Eight years of data for 40 firms listed on the NZX50 Stock Exchange, are 
collected and observations are analysed using a conditional quantile regression. This study 
finds firm-specific characteristics rather than corporate governance variables play a sig-
nificant role in determining firm leverage levels. The results indicate that finance policies 
need to vary across firm type and firm characteristics, and should match with the different 
borrowing requirements of listed firms.
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1. Introduction
This study investigates the capital structure of New Zealand’s large listed companies 
on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. A number of empirical studies find that firm 
capital structure is related to firm characteristics; namely firm size, tangibility, prof-
itability, tax-shield, growth, liquidity, firmrisk level and industry type (Fattouh et al. 
2008; Saksonova 2006; Fattouh et al. 2005; McConnell, Pettit 1984). Moreover, recent 
literature focuses on the subject matter of capital structure decisions, and association 
of corporate governance practices (Berger et al. 1997; Wen et al. 2002). Therefore, this 
study considers how firm characteristics and corporate governance practices both impact 
in capital structure choice in New Zealand listed firms. 
New Zealand provides an interesting case study for corporate financing policy and 
corporate governance. Although, the current 28% corporate tax rate reduces tax incen-
tives for using debt in New Zealand’s large corporations,this tax rate is high compared 
to similar sized OECD countries whose average is 25%. Therefore, tax incentives play 
a significant role in determining capital structure in New Zealand firms. This is con-
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firmed by Business Finance in New Zealand (2004), which indicates that New Zealand 
firms finance their assets more by debt than equity. Further, it shows the mean ratio of 
New Zealand firms debt-to-assets ratio is 0.60. This may be due to the broad range of 
financial instruments available in the New Zealand financial market. Smith, Chen and 
Anderson (2010) report, because of the low level of market anomalies and a developed 
banking system, New Zealand firms issue significantly more debt than equity. Though 
firms enjoy high debt levels, the identity of optimal level of debt is important in New 
Zealand firms because the country’s bankruptcy laws do not protect business owners 
as much as USA laws do. As an example, New Zealand does not provide homestead 
exemption or future earnings exceptions in their bankruptcy law. A personal cross guar-
antee requirement in the bank lending processes has worsened this problem. Addition-
ally, the New Zealand Securities Commission introduced a principal-based voluntary 
corporate governance code in 2004, this recent corporate governance changes have also 
had significant impact on the capital structure choices of New Zealand firms. 
The current study aims to empirically explore the relationship between firm characteris-
tics, the corporate governance practices and the capital structure of New Zealand listed 
companies by applying the method of conditional quantile regression. This quantile 
regression sketches the entire distribution of leverage, conditional on a set of explana-
tory variables. Moreover, since this study sample comprises large outliers and the dis-
tribution of the disturbances is non-normal, quantile regression is robust for this study. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to firm capital structure research. First it 
provides evidence that firm characteristics and corporate governance practices impact 
on firm capital structure choice. Secondly, most existing studies use data from listed 
companies in large markets such as the USA and UK, but it is important to consider 
how Australasian market firms, firm characteristics and corporate governance practices 
relate to capital structure choice. Finally, the econometric analysis is more robust than 
prior research due to the use of the quantile regression analysis. Quantile regression 
examines the whole distribution of the capital structure distribution of firms rather than 
a single measure of the central tendency of the capital structure distribution. 
The next section of the paper reviews prior research. This is followed by a discussion 
of the data, variables, method and procedures used in this present study. The findings 
and implications then follow. 
2. Literature review
Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958) seminal study of the debt irrelevance proposi-
tion in a perfect capital market, financial economists have introduced four new theories 
to explain the variations in debt ratios across firms. Pecking-order theory is based on 
the idea of information asymmetry between managers and investors (Mayers 1984; Ross 
1977). The theory proposes that firms prefer to finance new investment by first seeking 
internal retained earnings, then debt and finally with an issue of new equity. Tax-benefits 
trade-off theory is based on the idea that firms will seek to maintain optimal capital 
structure by balancing the costs and benefits from debts (DeAngelo, Masulis 1980). The 
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benefits and costs can be obtained in different ways. From a “tax-benefits” perspective, 
firms can reap the advantages of having debt to get tax benefits. From an “agency” per-
spective, debt mitigates the agency problem between shareholders and managers. The 
third capital structure relevant theory is agency costs theory, which explains conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and bondholders (Jensen, Meckling 1976). Accord-
ing to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the importance of agency costs of equity arises with 
the separation of ownership and control of firms. Hence, a high level of leverage may be 
used as disciplinary device to mitigate managerial cash flow waste. Moreover, agency 
costs can arise between debt and equity holders due to risk of default. The next theory 
is market timing theory. First discussed by Myers (1984), and it states that the strategy 
of buying and selling decision of capital is based on market timing benefits. If neither 
debt nor equity markets are favourable, managers may defer issuances. Alternatively 
if any market shows an extremely favourable situation, managers raised capital though 
firm does not need to raise capital in currently. Based on the above four theories, the 
factors impacting on firm capital structure can be categorised as three major categories: 
firm specific characteristics, industry specific characteristics, and market related char-
acteristics. This study will consider possible firm-specific characteristics: firm liquidity, 
tangibility, growth, risk, size, non-debt tax-shield, the industry in which the firm oper-
ates, non-executive directors’ percentage, director ownership and foreign ownership. 
Firm Size. Firm size has become an important determinant of capital structure. Due to 
higher bankruptcy costs, lower marginal corporate tax rates and high asymmetry infor-
mation, small firms have proportionately less debt than larger firms (Michaelas et al. 
1999). Studies of the determinants of New Zealand firm’s capital structure have also 
confirmed that large companies tend to use more leverage than small firms. As an ex-
ample, Business Finance in New Zealand (2004) explains only 29% of businesses with 
one-to-five employees request debt financing compared with 40% of large firms. This 
may be due to the following reasons. First, larger firms may have a higher credit rating 
than their smaller counterparts and therefore it is easier to access external financing due 
to lower information asymmetry (Subadar 2011). Secondly, larger firms are likely to 
have higher debt levels to maximise the tax benefits from debt (Rajan, Zingales 1995). 
Cassar (2004) argues that due to that high cost of external borrowing, small firms may 
prefer lower level of debts than larger firms. This is in line with Titman and Wessels 
(1988) who explain that smaller scale financing results in relatively higher transaction 
costs. Based on agency costs theory, Um (2001) argues that due to lower monitor-
ing costs in larger firms, larger firms tend to be using more debt than smaller firms. 
However, using quantile regression, Fattouh et al.(2008) find firm size has significant 
positive coefficient in lower quantiles of leverage and after the 75th quantile it changes, 
indicating regardless of firm size, if firms become highly leveraged they may no longer 
be able to borrow externally. 
Tangibility. Firms with high a proportion of tangible assets will be in a position to pro-
vide more collateral in their debts. Seventy-two percent of New Zealand’s external debt 
financing is provided by banks (Business Finance in New Zealand 2004). Therefore, 
the collateral requirements of banks have a significant effect on determining capital 
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structure in New Zealand firms. This is confirmed by Business Finance in New Zealand 
(2004) which indicates that due to insufficient collateral, 31% of debt requests were 
rejected in New Zealand. Agency theory suggests that issuing debt secured by collat-
eral may reduce the information asymmetry-related costs in financing. Tangible assets 
always reduce financial distress costs due to their high liquidation value (Harris, Raviv 
1991; Titman, Wessels 1988). Trade-off theory, explains that a firm’s tangible assets 
can be used as debt collateral. Prior research finds a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and its collateral (Frank, Goyal 2002; Um 2001). Nuri (2000) finds a positive 
relationship between firm tangibility and long-term debt. Bevan and Danbolt (2000, 
2002), Van-der-Wijst and Thurik (1993), Stohs and Mauer (1996) find a positive rela-
tionship between tangibility and long-term debt. Therefore, firms with more tangible 
assets have more opportunity to issue more debts. 
Liquidity. As predicted by the pecking-order model, Saksonova (2006), Frieder and 
Martell (2006), Lipson and Mortal (2009) find a negative relationship between firm 
leverage ratios and firm liquidity, indicating that firms with more liquid equity carry less 
debt. This may be because a high level of liquidity limits a firm’s ability to commit to 
specific causes of action, therefore limiting external borrowings. Based on agency costs 
theory, Myers and Rajan (1998) explain that when agency costs of liquidity are high, 
outside creditors limit the amount of debt financing available to the company. However, 
as predicted by trade-off theory, Harris and Raviv (1991), Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) 
find a positive relationship between firm leverage and liquidity ratio. This may be ex-
plained as liquidity assets can increase collateralisability of assets, which positively 
affect external borrowings. 
Non-debt tax-shield – Apart from interest expenses, other items known as non-debt 
tax-shields can help reduce in tax expenses. Firm depreciation is the common non-
debt tax-shield used in capital structure studies (Bauer 2004; Noulas, Genimakis 2011). 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) explain that non-debt tax shields work as a substitute for 
the tax benefits for debts. In line with the above findings, Fattouh et al. (2005) using 
South-Korean firms, confirm that when firms use high depreciation as a non-debt tax 
shield, they obtain lower debt levels. Moreover, Prahalathan (2007), using 19 manufac-
turing companies listed on the Sri Lanka Stock Exchange, finds a significant negative 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and firm leverage levels. 
Growth. Prior studies find mixed results for firm growth level and debt level. Brails-
ford et al. (2002) explain firm growth rate as proxy for available internal funds. Con-
sequently, based on pecking-order theory, firms with high growth rate have a nega-
tive relationship with external financing (Myers, Majluf 1984). Moreover, according 
to trade-off theory, firms with high growth rates tend to use less external financing, 
because growth rate is non-collateralised. Additionally, based on agency theory, Myers 
(1977), Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) find that firms with high growth rates tend to use 
less debt to mitigate agency conflicts that arise due to high information asymmetry. Ra-
jan and Zingales (1995) find two main reasons for a negative relationship between firm 
growth level and debt level. First, it is expected that as growth opportunities increase, 
the cost of financial distress also increases. Secondly, firms prefer to issue overvalued 
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equity. However, Booth et al.(2001) find a positive relationship between firm leverage 
level and firm growth, indicating high growth firms will tend to look outside the firm 
to finance. This is consistent with pecking-order theory. Um (2001) argues, based on 
pecking-order theory, that growing firms choose debt rather than equity. Pandey (2001) 
finds a significant positive relationship between growth and long- and short-term debt 
in Malaysian firms. 
Risk. Based on both pecking-order and trade-off theories, a firm’s volatility of earn-
ings (operating risk) increases probability of default because debt holders consider a 
firm’s future earnings as protection for debt (Mehran 1992). Therefore, high risk firms 
may have a negative impact on firm leverage levels. Aligned with that, Subadar et al. 
(2010) find a significant negative relationship between Mauritius financial firms’ risk 
and leverage levels. This is consistent with McConnell and Pettit (1984), who explain 
that high risk firms have higher probability of bankruptcy because they tend to have 
less gearing. In contrast, agency cost theory predicts a positive relationship between 
risk and leverage, because risk intensifies a negative impact on asymmetric information 
(Schoubben, Hulle 2004). However, limited empirical studies find a significant positive 
relationship between firm risk and leverage ratio (Jordan et al. 1998; Michaelas et al. 
1999). This may be due to distressed firms preferring to borrow more external financing 
to overcome bankruptcy.
Director ownership. Prior studies suggest that firm ownership structure has a significant 
influence on the desire for firm control, which has subsequent implications for financ-
ing. However, the exact relationship between director ownership and capital structure 
is inconclusive (Brailsford et al. 2002). Firms with higher director ownership are reluc-
tant to have external financing and their debt levels can be lower (Agca, Mansi 2006). 
Further, Berger et al. (1997) using US public corporations suggest that managerial 
entrenchment leads to debt avoidance. However, consistent with agency costs theory, 
Kim and Sorenson (1986) and Mehran (1992) find a significant positive relationship 
between firm board ownership and leverage levels, indicating closely-held firms reduce 
the information asymmetry problem. Consequently, they can more readily obtain debt.
Foreign Ownership. With foreign ownership, an increase in leverage is expected with 
lower cost of debt due to a firm’s increased ability to access to new external funds on 
more favourable terms (Gurunlu, Gursoy 2010). However, in line with Jensen (1986) 
and agency theory, Wiwattanakantang (1999) argues that due to the geographical dis-
tance of foreign owners, the level of misalignment between owners and managers can 
be high. Hence, firms with foreign ownership may adopt less debt financing. This result 
is further confirmed by Gurunlu and Gursoy (2010) who find a significant negative rela-
tionship between foreign ownership percentage and long-term debt of companies listed 
on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. On the other hand, using Canadian listed companies, 
King and Santor (2008) find there is no significant impact on foreign ownership and 
company leverage levels. 
Non-executive directors. In recent decades regulations have emphasised the importance 
of board independence and non-executive directors on company boards (Higgs Report 
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2003). Jensen (1986), Berger et al. (1997) and Abor (2007) find a positive relationship 
between non-executive directors’ percentage on boards and firm leverage ratios. This 
indicates that outside directors have a positive impact on corporate leverage. One possi-
ble explanation for that is that non-executive directors ensure managerial accountability 
of shareholders, reduce agency conflicts of shareholders and managers, which leads to 
firms adopting high-debt policies. Nevertheless, Wen et al. (2002) find a significant 
negative relationship between non-executive directors and firm leverage. The possible 
explanation for that is non-executive directors actively monitor managers which causes 
these managers to adopt low external financing policies.
3. Data
Sample
This study collected data from Thomson One Banker database for the top 50 publicly 
listed companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange under the NZX50 category for 
the period 2003–2010. The NZX50 companies are the largest 50 companies listed on 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange by free float market capitalisation. One major reason 
for starting the data collection from 2003 is because the NZX50 was introduced in 
New Zealand that year. Another reason is New Zealand recent corporate governance 
reforms started in 2003 and in 2004 the New Zealand Securities Commission introduced 
a voluntary principal-based corporate governance code. Though this code is a comply-
or-explain-type code, most listed companies’ follow the proposed corporate governance 
practices in New Zealand. This study excludes all financial companies, because the na-
ture of their liabilities is different from non-financial firms. From that sample, only 40 
companies provided all the required data from all years in the range, 2003–2009. The 
final sample represents 80% of the mean number of firms listed in the NZX50 index.
Dependent variables 
Following empirical evidence of prior studies, this study uses the most traditional mea-
sure as leverage proxy – the ratio of total liabilities divided by the total assets (Sakso-
nova 2006). 
Explanatory variables
To capture the corporate governance effect on firm capital structure, this study included 
foreign share ownership (FOREIGN), director share ownership (DOWN) and percent-
age of non-executive directors (PNED). Prior empirical studies identify firm-specific 
characteristics such as firm size, assets tangibility, growth rate, liquidity, non-debt tax 
shield and risk as the main determinants of firm capital structure (Rajan, Zingales 1995; 
Ramlall 2009). From the above independence variables, firm size, tangibility, growth 
rate, risk and liquidity can be interpreted as proxies for agency costs or other costs that 
arise due to asymmetric information (Fattouh et al. 2008). Moreover, trade-off theory 
explains capital structure influence by taxes. All the variables in this study are based 
on book values. This study also includes six dummy variables to capture the industry-
specific effects. Following prior literature, firm size is calculated by natural logarithm 
of total assets (Michaelas et al. 1999; Titman, Wessels 1988). The tangibility ratio is 
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calculated as total fixed assets to total assets. Following Fattouh et al. (2008) to measure 
growth opportunities, this study uses annual growth of the firm’s total sales. Following 
Bradley et al. (1984), this study measures firm risk as the standard deviation of the an-
nual earnings, scaled by the average value of the total assets over time. The ratio of cur-
rent assets over current liabilities is considered the liquidity (LIQUID) variable in this 
study. Non-debt tax shield is calculated as the ratio of total depreciation to total assets. 
This study also includes the percentage of shares held by foreigners and percentage of 
shares held by directors. Moreover, percentage of non-executive directors is calculated 
as the ratio of total non-executive directors to total assets.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Median Std Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
DEBTASSETS 280 .4399522 0.433792 .2276556 0 1.315084 .3931158 3.08948
SIZE 280 5.314568 5.413003 .9539011 2.663701 6.91782 –.6135989 2.965213
TANG 280 .5276358 0.473862 .5676104 0 8.173598 8.799369 118.7772
LIQUID 280 2.295501 1.450474 3.267381 0.08458 29.05655 4. 32.05645
TAX 280 .0644478 0.035693 .1395774 –.013548 1.128158 5.459117 36.4116
GROWTH 240 .2027083 0.046427 .8381288 –.8165842 8.513044 6.681953 57.64042
RISK 280 .1031871 0.049498 .2381227 0 3.054701 8.447098 93.94616
DOWN 280 .168316 0.040454 .233664 0 .9755613 1.566797 4.633394
FOWN 280 .0614643 0 .1192464 0 1 2.486686 9.393099
PNED 280 .6398781 0.732143 .3247655 0 1 –.8555195 2.570121
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample data. The mean value of total debt 
to assets ratio is 0.44. This leverage proxy indicates high use of corporate debt in New 
Zealand listed companies. This is in line with Gunasekarage et al. (2006) who explain 
that the average debt to assets ratio for large companies in New Zealand is 48%. More-
over, Alves and Ferreira (2011) using New Zealand firms from 1996–2001 indicate that 
New Zealand firms’ debt to assets ratio (book value) is 42%. These findings indicate 
that large New Zealand companies rely on debt as source of finance. Descriptive statis-
tics indicate mean value of firm liquidity is 2.295. This may be because high investor 
protection of New Zealand companies leads them to increase their liquidity levels. Firm 
tangibility assets vary between 0% to 82% and mean value is 52.7%. This indicates a 
fairly large proportion of total assets come from fixed assets. However, this value is 
significantly less than South Korean market findings by Fattouh et al. (2005). The non-
debt tax shield variable indicates the mean value of TAX variable is 0.064. This value 
is approximately two times higher than the emerging market study by Wiwattanakan-
tang (1999). Results indicate that sample firm growth rate is 0.2. This low growth rate 
is consistent with Gurunlu and Gursoy (2010) who state that developed market firms’ 
growth rates are significantly low. According to Table I, the RISK variable indicates a 
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mean value of 0.103. This value is smaller than emerging market findings by Sheikh and 
Wang (2011). This value indicates less volatility in New Zealand firm cash flow. Though 
the mean value of DOWN variable is 16.8%, the median value indicates 50% of sample 
firms have only 0.4% of director ownership. Not surprisingly, the study sample shows 
low foreign ownership in NZX50 firms. The mean foreign ownership is only 6.14% and 
median value indicates 50% of large firms have no foreign ownership. This confirms 
that trend towards more New Zealand local ownership and less foreign ownership in 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange in last five years. As a result of recent corporate 
governance reforms, New Zealand listed firms now have more non-executive directors 
on their boards. Table 1’s descriptive statistics confirm the above statement and shows 
the mean value of non-executive directors in NZX50 firms is 64%. 
If the value of skewenss is zero and kurtosis is less than 3, data are normally distrib-
uted. According to Mukherjee et al. (1998) if the skewness value is equal to zero, the 
distribution of the data is symmetric. If the kurtosis value is less than 3, tails of the 
data are thin. Table 1 shows, except for SIZE and PNED, all other variables skewness 
values are not closer to zero and their kurtosis is greater than 3. Therefore, all other 
variables (except SIZE and PNED) are not systematically distributed. This indicates all 
observations have extreme values. 
4. Methodology
Considering the descriptive statistics, one of the important issues in this data sample 
is that it contains large outliers and distribution of the disturbances is not normal. To 
further check normality for each variable this study uses the Jarque-Bera normality test. 
The result indicates that except for SIZE and PNED all other variables can reject the 
null hypothesis that the data are normally distributed. This result confirms that applying 
a conditional mean estimator is not appropriate for this sample data set. Hence, OLS 
regressions produce biased and inefficient estimates. Conversely, quantile regression is 
more powerful than OLS regression, because it produces separate estimates for all con-
ditional quantiles of a response variable’s distribution (Ramdani, Witteloostuijn 2010). 
Further, they explain quantile regression works better than OLS regression, especially 
for skewed data, unequal variance (heteroscedasticity) and existence of outliers. 
Quantile regression as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) seeks to comple-
ment classical linear regression analysis. Quantile regression essentially transforms a 
conditional distribution function into a conditional quantile function by splitting it into 
segments. In OLS, modelling a conditional distribution function of a random sample 
(y1,……yn) with a parametric function m(xi,β) where xi represents the independent vari-
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Obtains the conditional expectation function E[Y | xi] can proceed in quantile regression. 
The central feature thereby becomes rτ, which serves as a check function.
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Here, in contrast to OLS, the minimization is done for each subsection defined by rτ, 
where the estimate of the τth-quantile function is achieved with the parametric func-
tion ξ(xi,β) (Koenker, Hallock 2001). Additionally, to confirm the robust results, this 
study used a matrix bootstrap method to obtain estimates of the standard errors for the 
coefficients in quantile regression under many forms of heterogeneity. Construction of 
confidence intervals based on the quantile regression estimator can be greatly simpli-
fied by using the bootstrap. Further, based on a Monte Carlo study, Buchinsky (1998) 
explains that the design matrix bootstrap method performs well with a relatively small 
sample size and is valid under different forms of heterogeneity. 
5. Results
Table 2 indicates the regression results for debt to assets ratio. Column II–VI shows 
quantile regression results for q = 0.05, q = 0.25, q = 0.50, q = 0.75, q = 0.90 respec-
tively. The quantile regression results indicate that the effects of capital structure vari-
ables and firm size variable differ across the quantiles in the conditional distribution of 
firm leverage level. To further illustrate, quantiles are visualised in Fig 1. 
Figure 1 indicates that firm growth has the largest positive effect around q = .01, be-
ing significantly small in higher quantiles. This may be consistent with pecking order 
theory; firms with higher growth opportunities may use less debt to prevent any prob-
lems with under-investment or agency conflicts between lenders and owners. Further-
more, according to the Myers (1984), this may be due to high interest rates or restric-
tive covenants that discourage debt intakes in growing firms. Consistent with Fattouh 
et al. (2008), with higher leveraged firms the marginal agency costs associated with 
non- collateralisable assets increases and this acts as a disincentive to leverage.
As can be seen in Table 2, tangibility is negatively and significantly throughout all 
quantiles. Overall, this finding is opposed to trade-off theory, which explains firm tan-
gibility has a positive impact on firm debt capacity. However, this finding is consistent 
with Morellec (2001), Myers and Rajan (1998) and Venkiteshwaran (2011), who ex-
plain when firms can engage in ex-post asset sales or in transformation of these assets, 
then this higher liquidity leads to reduction in a firm’s external borrowings. That may 
be because when agency costs of liquidity are high, outside creditors limit the amount 
of debt financing available to the company. Further, it may be that low information 
asymmetry associated with tangible assets makes equity issuances less costly. Hence, 
firms maintain low debt ratios with high tangibility. Though the non-debt tax shield is 
negative in all parts of the distribution, the TAX variable is significant only in higher 
quantiles. This finding is consistent with Fattouh et al. (2005) who posit that the rela-
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tive advantages of resorting to debt as a tax shield alternative to depreciation is lower 
for high level of leverage. 
Table 2, shows that RISK is significantly and negatively associated with firm leverage 
levels in the quantiles 0.25, 0.75 and 0.90. This finding is consistent with pecking order 
theory and trade-off theory, which suggest that the negative relationship between firm 
Table 2. Quantile regression results for debt to assets ratio
Variables Quantile regression
(I) Q 0.05 (II) Q 0.25(III) Q 0.50(IV) Q 0.75(V) Q 0.90(VI)
No of 































































































































R2/Pseudo R 0.3476 0.2653 0.2517 0.2499 0.3032
This model provides stranded errors which are in parentheses. aun balanced panel, *Significant at 10% 
level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level.
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risk and debt level increases with the volatility of income. This may be because firms 
with more volatile cash flows face high expected costs of financial distress which leads 
to use less debt in their capital structure. Moreover, high risk is detrimental from a share-
holder perspective. Thus shareholders may force high risk firms to have low leverage. 
The coefficient of FOREIGN is significantly negatively related to firm leverage level in 
the quantile 0.90. This may be due to foreign investors demanding management use low 
debt to avoid the bankruptcy risk in highly leveraged firms. The possible explanation for 
that is due to high information asymmetry between foreign owners and local managers, 
foreign owners may try to avoid having more debts in their capital structure after a cer-
tain level. Additionally, Wiwattanakantang (1999) explains the use of debt financing as 
disciplinary mechanisms for management is less adopted in foreign ownership, because 
foreign shareholders are more likely to actively monitor the company. The estimated 
coefficient of the PNED variable is not significant. This may be because though firms 
have a high number of non-executive directors, the directors are not independent or 
have less information availability. Based on the UK study, the Higgs Report (2003) also 
indicates that most non-executive directors are recruiting via personal contacts in UK. 
This practice may be similar in New Zealand. Hence non-executive directors may create 
a “rubber stamp board” approving CEO/chairperson board decisions without question. 
Therefore non-executive directors may have no impact on firm capital structure deci-
sion in New Zealand firms. The DOWN variable is also non-significantly related with 
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Fig. 1. Quantile regression results
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capital structure proxy and reveals that there is no impact from non-executive directors 
and director ownership when determining New Zealand firm leverage levels. 
Results indicate a significant positive relationship between firm size and firm leverage 
level throughout all quantiles. It may be that larger firms have a higher credit rating than 
their smaller counterparts. Therefore, it is easy to access external financing due to lower 
information asymmetry (Subadar et al. 2010). Furthermore, firm size is an inverse proxy 
for credit risk. Hence, the probability of bankruptcy is significantly low in large firms 
that can enjoy high debt levels in their capital structure. Finally, the industry dummy 
variables indicate significant impact on all quantiles. This indicates industry varying 
factors have significant impact on both low and high leveraged firms. This finding is 
consistent with Saksonova (2006), who finds the nature of the industry has significant 
impact on company assets and liquidity. 
6. Conclusions and implications
This paper uses quantile regression analysis to identify how capital structure relations 
differ across firms at different quantiles of the leverage distribution. Moreover, this 
study finds firm-specific characteristics (i.e. tangibility, liquidity, risk, growth, tax-shield 
and firm size) play a significant role in determining firm leverage levels rather than 
corporate governance variables. 
Another main implication of this study is the relevance of capital structure theories and 
financing as it applies to New Zealand listed businesses. The capital structure choices 
in emerging market firms can be determined by firm liquidity, tangibility, tax-shield, 
growth rate, risk, firm size and industry. However, these variables have different impact 
on different levels of leverage quantiles. Nevertheless, finance policies need to vary 
across firm type and firm characteristics, and should match the different borrowing 
requirements of listed firms.
References 
Abor, J. 2007. Corporate governance and financing decisions of Ghanaian listed firms, corporate 
governance, International Journal of Business in Society 7(1): 83–92. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720700710727131 
Agca, S.; Mansi, S. 2006. Takeover defences, managerial ownership, and firm leverage, SSRN. 
March 14, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890745
Al-Najjar, B.; Taylor, P. 2008. The relationship between capital structure and ownership structure, 
Managerial Finance 34(12): 919–933. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074350810915851
Alves, P. F. P.; Ferreira, M. A. 2011. Capital structure and law around the world, Journal of Mul-
tinational Financial Management 21: 119–150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2011.02.001
Bauer, P. 2004. Determinants of capital structure empirical evidence from the Czech Republic, 
Czech Journal of Economics and Finance 54(1–2): 2–21.
Berger, P. G.; Ofek, E.; Yermack, D. L. 1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure 
decisions, Journal of Finance 52(4): 1411–1438. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2329441
Bevan, A.; Danbolt, J. 2000. Dynamics in the determinants of capital structure in the UK, Wor-
king paper. University of Glasgow. 
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2013, 14(5): 852–866
864
Bevan, A.; Danbolt, J. 2002. Capital structure and its determinants in the UK – a decomposition 
analysis, Applied Financial Economics 12(3): 159–170. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09603100110090073
Booth, L.; Aivazian, V.; Demirguc-Kunt, A.; Maksimovic, V. 2001. Capital structures in develo-
ping countries, Journal of Finance 56(1): 87–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00320
Bradley, M.; George, A. J.; Kim, E. H. 1984. On the existence of an optimal capital structure in 
developing countries, Journal of Finance 39 857–880. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03680.x
Brailsford, T. J.; Oliver, B. R.; Pua, S. L. H. 2002. On the relation between ownership structure 
and capital structure, Accounting and Finance 42(1): 1–26. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-629X.00001
Buchinsky, M. 1998. Recent advances in quantile regression models: a practical guideline for 
empirical research, Journal of Human Resources 33(1): 88–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/146316
Business Finance in New Zealand. 2004. Statistics New Zealand.
Cassar, G. 2004. The financing of business start-ups, Journal of Business Venturing 19(2): 261–
283. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026(03)00029-6
DeAngelo, H.; Masulis, R. 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation, 
Journal of Financial Economics 8(1): 3–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(80)90019-7
Fattouh, B.; Harris, L.; Scaramozzino, P. 2008. Non-linearity in the determinants of capital 
structure: evidence from UK firms, Empirical Economics 34(3): 417–438. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00181-007-0128-3
Fattouh, B.; Scaramozzino, P.; Harris, L. 2005. Capital structure in South Korea: a quantile re-
gression approach, Journal of Developmental Economics 76(1): 231–250. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.12.014 
Frank, M. Z.; Goyal, K. V. 2002. Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure, Journal 
of Financial Economics 67(2): 1–30.
Frieder, L.; Martell, R. 2006. On capital structure and the liquidity of a firm’s stock, Working 
paper. Purdue University.
Gunasekarage, A.; Locke, S.; Ready, K.; Scrimgeour, F. 2006. Corporate governance practices 
of large firms in New Zealand and firm performance: an empirical investigation, in 19th Annual 
Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 13–15 December, Sydney.
Gurunlu, M.; Gursoy, G. 2010. The influence of foreign ownership on capital structure of non-fi-
nancial firms: evidence from Istanbul Stock Exchange, The IUP Journal of Corporate Gover-
nance 9(4): 21–29.
Harris, M.; Raviv, A. 1991. The theory of capital structure, Journal of Finance 46(1): 297–355. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2328697
Higgs Report. 2003. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. 
Jensen, M.; Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305–360.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American 
Economic Review 76(2): 323–329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Jordan, J.; Lowe, J.; Taylor, P. 1998. Strategy and financial management in UK small firms, 
Journal of Finance and Accounting 25(1): 1–27.
Kim, W. S.; Sorenson, E. H. 1986. Evidence on the impact of agency costs of debt on corporate 
debt policy, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21(2): 131–144. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2330733
King, M. R.; Santor, E. 2008. Trading places: impact of foreign ownership changes on Canadian 
firms, Journal of Banking and Finance 32(11): 2423–2432. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.02.002
N. H. Wellalage, S. Locke. Capital structure and its determinants in New Zealand firms
865
Koenker, R.; Bassett, G. S. 1978. Regression quantiles, Econometrica 46(1): 33–50. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913643
Koenker, R.; Hallock, K. 2001. Quantile regression, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4): 
143–156. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.4.143
Lipson, M. L.; Mortal, S. 2009. Liquidity and capital structure, Journal of Financial Markets 
12(4): 611–664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2009.04.002
Mayers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 34(3): 575–592. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2327916
McConnell, J. J.; Pettit, R. R. 1984. Application of the modern theory of finance to small business 
firms, in P. M. Horvitz, R. R. Pettit (Eds.). Small Business Finance. 1 ed. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Mehran, H. 1992. Exective incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure, Journal of 
FInancial and Quantitative Analysis 27(4): 539–560. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2331139
Michaelas, N.; Chittenden, F.; Poutziouris, P. 1999. Financial policy and capital structure choice 
in U.K. SMEs: empirical evidence from company panel data, Small Business Economics 12(2): 
113–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008010724051
Modigliani, F.; Miller, M. 1958. The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of invest-
ments, American Economic Review 48(3): 291–297.
Morellec, E. 2001. Asset liquidity, capital structure and secured debt, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 61(2): 173–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00059-9
Mukherjee, C.; White, H.; Wuyts, M. 1998. Econometrics and data analysis for developing 
countries. New York: Routledge.
Myers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39(3) 575–592. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2327916
Myers, S.; Majluf, N. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have in-
formation that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187–221. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0
Myers, S.; Rajan, R. 1998. The paradox of liquidity, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(3): 
733–771. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355398555739
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5: 
147–175. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
Noulas, A.; Genimakis, G. 2011. The determinants of capital structure choice: evidence from 
Greek listed companies, Applied Financial Economics 21(6): 379–387. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09603107.2010.532108
Nuri, J. 2000. A study of capital structure in the UK: hotel and retail industries. Surrey University.
Pandey, I. 2001. Corporate dividend policy and behaviour: the Malaysian experience, Working 
paper No. 2001-11-01. Ahmadabad: Indian Institute of Management. 
Prahalathan, B. 2007. The determinants of capital structure: an empirical analysis of listed manu-
facturing companies in Colombo Stock Exchange Market in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, University 
of Kelaniya.
Rajan, R. G.; Zingales, L. 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from 
international data, Journal of Finance 50(5): 1421–1460. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2329322
Ramdani, D.; Witteloostuijn, A. V. 2010. The impact of board independence and CEO duality 
on firm performance: a quantile regression analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and 
Thailand, British Journal of Management 21(3): 607–626. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2010.00708.x
Ramlall, I. 2009. Determinants of capital structure among non-quoted mauritian firms under spe-
cificity of leverage: looking for a modified packing order theory, International Research Journal 
of Financial and Economics 1(31): 1450–2887.
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2013, 14(5): 852–866
866
Ross, G. C. 1977. The determination of financial structure: the incentive signalling approach, Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Studies Spring: 23–40.
Saksonova, S. 2006. The analysis of company’s capital and evaluation of factors, which influence 
creation of the optimal capital structure, Journal of Business Economics and Management 7(3): 
147–153.
Schoubben, F.; Hulle, C. V. 2004. The determinants of leverage: differences between quoted and 
non quoted firms, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 49: 589–621.
Sheikh, N. A.; Wang, Z. 2011. Determinants of capital structure: an empirical study of firms in 
manufacturing industry of Pakistan, Managerial Finance 37(2): 117–133. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074351111103668
Smith, D. J.; Chen, J.; Anderson, H. D. 2010. The relationship between capital structure and 
product markets: evidence from New Zealand, in New Zealand Finance Colloquium, February, 
2008, Palmerston North.
Stohs, M. H.; Mauer, D. C. 1996. The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure, Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting 69(3): 279–312.
Subadar, U. A. 2011. Capital asset pricing model: evidence from the stock exchange of Mauritius, 
The IUP Journal of Financial Economics 9(1): 24–40.
Titman, S.; Wessels, R. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice, Journal of Finance 
43(1): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x
Um, T. 2001. Determination of capital structure and prediction of bankruptcy in Korea. Cornell 
University.
Van-der-Wijst, D.; Thurik, R. 1993. Determinants of small firm debt ratios: an analysis of retail 
panel data, Small Business Economics 5(1): 55–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01539318
Venkiteshwaran, V. 2011. Asset tangibility and corporate debt capacity – an empirical investiga-
tion, in SWFA Conference, 9–12 March, 2011, Houston, Texas.
Wen, Y.; Rwegasira, K.; Bilderbeek, J. 2002. Corporate governance and capital structure deci-
sions of Chinese listed firms, Corporate Governance: an International Review 10(2): 75–83. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271
Wiwattanakantang, Y. 1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of 
Thai firms, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7(3–4): 371–403. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0927-538X(99)00007-4
Nirosha Hewa WELLALAGE is a Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of Waikato Manage-
ment School. Her main research interests are in the areas of corporate governance, corporate finance 
and small business finance. She is an active researcher and has published her findings in several 
international refereed journals.
Stuart LOCKE is Professor at Department of Finance, University of Waikato Management School, 
Hamilton, New Zealand, 3240. Stuart has a PhD in finance and a background in finance, economics, 
valuation and chartered accountancy. His current research interests are in corporate governance capi-
tal market movements, agribusiness finance, small business finance and personal financial planning. 
Research projects are ongoing in the governance, market movement, agribusiness finance and small 
business areas with multiple publications in 1999 through 2008. Stuart has held positions at universi-
ties in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. He has worked in banking in Australia and 
Singapore and with Treasury in Australia. Most recently, before joining Waikato Management School 
he was involved in Executive Education at Massey University with the MBA programme and the pub-
lic sector management programmes in Samoa, Cook Islands and Tonga. Dr Locke currently teaches 
professional courses in finance and management.
N. H. Wellalage, S. Locke. Capital structure and its determinants in New Zealand firms
